Tuesday, October 23, 2012

virna silao 2



ELLIS V. REPUBLIC (1963)
[ G. R. No. L-16922, April 30, 1963 ]
IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE. MARVIN G. ELLIS AND GLORIA C. ELLIS, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.
FACTS:
Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September 8, 1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa&mdashan institution for unwed mothers and their babies—stating that she (the mother) could not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's) family.

Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on. January 14, I960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before, or, to be exact, in 1953.

ISSUE:
Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose.
RULING:
No.
Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:
"The following cannot adopt:
* * * * * * *

"(4) Non-resident aliens;"
* * * * * * *
This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we may sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain, unless it has jurisdiction, not only over tho subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.
Inasmuch s petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines,—and, hence, non-resident aliens—we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over their status, under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory. ln any event, whether the above-quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over the, res, or merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners it.


LWV CONSTRUCTION V. DUPO (2009)
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 172342, July 13, 2009 ]
LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. MARCELO B. DUPO, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:
Petitioner, a domestic corporation which recruits Filipino workers, hired respondent as Civil Structural Superintendent to work in Saudi Arabia for its principal, Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment (MMG). On February 26, 1992, respondent signed his first overseas employment contract, renewable after one year. It was renewed five times on the following dates: May 10, 1993, November 16, 1994, January 22, 1996, April 14, 1997, and March 26, 1998. All were fixed-period contracts for one year. The sixth and last contract stated that respondent's employment starts upon reporting to work and ends when he leaves the work site. Respondent left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999 and arrived in the Philippines on May 1, 1999.
On May 28, 1999, respondent informed MMG, through the petitioner, that he needs to extend his vacation because his son was hospitalized. He also sought a promotion with salary adjustment.[3] In reply, MMG informed respondent that his promotion is subject to management's review; that his services are still needed; that he was issued a plane ticket for his return flight to Saudi Arabia on May 31, 1999; and that his decision regarding his employment must be made within seven days, otherwise, MMG "will be compelled to cancel [his] slot." On July 6, 1999, respondent resigned.
Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at least five (5) years in a company within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, is entitled to the so-called long service award which is known to others as longevity pay of at least one half month pay for every year of service. In excess of five years an employee is entitled to one month pay for every year of service. In both cases inclusive of all benefits and allowances.

ISSUE:
1.      WON  respondent is entitled to a service award or longevity pay of US$12,640.33 under the provisions of the Saudi Labor Law; and
2.      WON prescription barred respondent's claim for service award as the complaint was filed one year and seven months after the sixth contract ended.
RULING:
1.      Respondent's service award under Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law has already been paid.
Article 87 clearly grants a service award. It reads:
Article 87

Where the term of a labor contract concluded for a specified period comes to an end or where the employer cancels a contract of unspecified period, the employer shall pay to the workman an award for the period of his service to be computed on the basis of half a month's pay for each of the first five years and one month's pay for each of the subsequent years. The last rate of pay shall be taken as basis for the computation of the award. For fractions of a year, the workman shall be entitled to an award which is proportionate to his service period during that year. Furthermore, the workman shall be entitled to the service award provided for at the beginning of this article in the following cases:

A. If he is called to military service.

B. If a workman resigns because of marriage or childbirth.

C. If the workman is leaving the work as a result of a force majeure beyond his control.(Emphasis supplied.)

2.      On the matter of prescription, however, we cannot agree with petitioner that respondent's action has prescribed under Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law. What applies is Article 291 of our Labor Code which reads:
ART. 291. Money claims. -- All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

x x x x

In Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator,[27] we held that Article 291 covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship and is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers.
Thus, in our considered view, respondent's complaint was filed well within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor Code. This point, however, has already been mooted by our finding that respondent's service award had been paid, albeit the payroll termed such payment as severance pay.






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