Final examination in Conflict of Laws

1.Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc. (BMSI), a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts.

On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc. (RUST), Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract. On 28 September 1995, Labor Arbiter Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent’s money claims.Upon appeal by BMSI, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent’s complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the case to this Court but was dismissed in a Resolution dated 26 November 1997. The Resolution became final and executory on 09 November 1998.

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 1192-BG, named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case. The complaint essentially reiterated the allegations in the labor case that BMSI verbally employed respondent to negotiate the sale of services in government projects and that respondent was not paid the commissions due him from the Pinatubo dredging project which he secured on behalf of BMSI. The complaint also averred that BMSI and RUST as well as petitioner itself had combined and functioned as one company.

In its Answer,petitioner alleged that contrary to respondent’s claim, it was a foreign corporation duly licensed to do business in the Philippines and denied entering into any arrangement with respondent or paying the latter any sum of money. Petitioner also denied combining with BMSI and RUST for the purpose of assuming the alleged obligation of the said companies.Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as "Special Sales Representative Agreement," the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.

AS judge, will you dismiss the case for said reasons? Explain.

2. Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office.

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.

IS THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CORRECT? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

3. Recently in Hasegawa v. Kitamura,the Court outlined three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of judgments.

Explain these three consecutive phases.

4. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

            Is this true or false? Explain your answer.

5. It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of it. What are these three alternatives?

6. Note that resolving a conflict of laws problem,  one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable law, such as the following: "(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved; (4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci intentionis. (7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori"the law of the forum"is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of ‘procedure’ not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.

Under CONFLICT OF LAWS, WHAT DO YOU CALL THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES?

7. Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It has a Philippine office located at 4/F, Metro House Building, Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City.[3] In its Petition filed with this court, Saudia identified itself as follows:

1. Petitioner SAUDIA is a foreign corporation established and existing under the Royal Decree No. M/24 of 18.07.1385H (10.02.1962G) in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ("KSA"). Its Philippine Office is located at 4/F Metro House Building, Sen, Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati City (Philippine Office). It may be served with orders of this Honorable Court through undersigned counsel at 4th and 6th Floors, Citibank Center Bldg., 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City.

Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.[5] After undergoing seminars required by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for deployment overseas, as well as training modules offered by Saudia (e.g., initial flight attendant/training course and transition training), and after working as Temporary Flight Attendants, respondents became Permanent Flight Attendants. They then entered into Cabin Attendant contracts with Saudia: Ma. Jopette M. Rebesencio (Ma. Jopette) on May 16, 1990;[6] Montassah B. Sacar-Adiong (Montassah) and Rouen Ruth A. Cristobal (Rouen Ruth) on May 22, 1993;[7] and Loraine Schneider-Cruz (Loraine) on August 27, 1995.[8]Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates in 2006.[9]
Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal. They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant.As respondents alleged, they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. Initially, Saudia had given its approval but later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves. In addition, it required respondents to file their resignation letters.[11]

x x x

Saudia asserts that Philippine courts and/or tribunals are not in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts. This is because respondents' Cabin Attendant contracts require the application of the laws of Saudi Arabia, rather than those of the Philippines. It claims that the difficulty of ascertaining foreign law calls into operation the principle of forum non conveniens, thereby rendering improper the exercise of jurisdiction by Philippine tribunals.

QUESTION: IS SAUDIA CORRECT? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

8. Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage constituted over a third party mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by filing an action for the collection of the principal loan before foreign courts?  Explain  your answer.

9. The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo  was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the father's name was left blank.[9]Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her.  In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo's salary and all other obligations for Paula's daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.  The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula's father and stepmother.  The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce  with the  Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego.  Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings.  On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. X x xOn May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.  This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied.  Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739”

QUESTION: IS THE RULING OF THE RTC CORRECT? EXPLAIN YOUR ANSWER.

10. Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September 8, 1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa&mdashan institution for unwed mothers and their babies—stating that she (the mother) could not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's) family.Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on. January 14, I960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before, or, to be exact, in 1953.

QUESTION: Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. RULE AND EXPLAIN.

End of the EXAMINATION