jene CADUNGOG

YASIN V. SHARIA DISTRICT COURT (1995)

EN BANC

(G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995)

FACTS:

 On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden name.” The respondent court ordered amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order alleging that the petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and surname after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioner’s maiden name and surname.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not in the case of annulment of marriage, or divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and the husband is married again to another woman and the former desires to resume her maiden name or surname, is she required to file a petition for change of name and comply with the formal requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

NO. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.

The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL

(G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010)

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING:

Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

TOLENTINO V. DAVID (1988)

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

The petitioner is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino, their marriage having been celebrated on April 21, 1945 in Manila. The union produced three children.

Respondent Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo Tolentino on February 8, 1931. Their marriage likewise produced children. The marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation on September 15, 1943 by a decree of absolute divorce granted by the Court of First Instance of Manila, on the ground of desertion and abandonment by the wife, Consuelo David for at least three (3) continuous years.

Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon after their marriage. Tolentino subsequently married Constancia on April 21, 1945.

Consuelo David, on the other hand, continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time of the filing of this complaint.

ISSUES:

1.   Whether or not the petitioner’s cause of action has already prescribed.

2.   Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.

RULING :

 Where the plaintiff fails to go to the Court within the prescriptive period, he loses his cause, but not because the defendant had acquired ownership by adverse possession over his name but because the plaintiff’s cause of action had lapsed thru the statute of limitations.The petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against the private respondent after she gained knowledge of the use by the private respondent of the surname of her former husband. As it is, action was brought only on November 23, 1971. The petitioner should have filed her complaint at once when it became evident that the private respondent would not accede to her demands instead of waiting for twenty (20) years

On the principal issue of whether or not a divorced woman may continue using the surname of her former husband, Philippine law is understandably silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws and consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for.

The use of the surname Tolentino does not impinge on the rights of the petitioner; there being no actual legal injury to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for injunctive relief.

Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The writs of preliminary and mandatory injunction issued by the trial court are SET ASIDE.

SY V. UY

(G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972)

EN BANC

FACTS: 

On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. LapuzSy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.In his second amended answer to the petition, respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. LapuzSy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.

Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O. LapuzSy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.

ISSUES:

1.   Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?

2.   If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?

RULING:

An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actiopersonalismoritur cum persona.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

BAYOT VS. BAYOT

(G.R. No. 155635,  November 7, 2008)

FACTS:

Vicente and Rebecca are husband and wife. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar TanchiongMakapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican court granted the divorce and the same court settled the couple’s property relations pursuant to an agreement they executed.

Meanwhile, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage. Rebecca, however, later moved and secured approvalof the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.

Ruling:

Petition DENIED.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. 

Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad.

And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.