ruiz digest

                            

 DILWEG V. PHILLIPS (1964)

[ G.R. No. L-19596, October 30, 1964 ]

 FACTS:

         On 7 February 1958 plaintiff Lavern R. Dilweg, a nonresident American citizen, through counsel, instituted the complaint at bar consisting of six causes of action against defendants Robert O. Phillips, Inocentes G. Dineros, and Isaac S. Eceta, claiming civil damages arising out of alleged libelous and defamatory statements uttered and published in the Philippines by the latter. On 24 February 1958 the first two named defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff interposed an opposition thereto on 7 March 1958.                         

          On 11 May 1961 the trial court issued an order, which is the subject of the present appeal, the pertinent portion of which is as follows:

         "This action is one for damages by reason of alleged libelous statements uttered in the Philippines by the defendants against the plaintiff. In other words, it is an action bared on a tort or act, which under the law of the Philippines, is defined as a criminal offense. At the time the said libelous statements were uttered, the plaintiff was in Washington, D.C. where, he was and has always been a resident. There is no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff has ever been in the Philippines or has resided at anytime therein.

        "The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff by the filing of his complaint. It was contended that as the plaintiff therein has never been a resident of the Philippines, the courts of this country have not acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of his action bared on a contract which was executed in the State of New York,USA.

         The Court has come to conclusion that in order that it may validly try this case, it must have jurisdiction not only over the persons of the parties and over the subject matter and the plaintiff must be a resident within the territorial of this Court in order that jurisdiction over his person can be acquired, otherwise the Court will not be able to render a valid judgment against him.

ISSUE:

        Whether or not our Philippine courts can rightfully refuse to assume jurisdiction over a personal action instituted by a nonresident alien who is not within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts?

RULING:

         It is thus evident that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the court below, it is not indispensable for a foreigner to establish a residence, nor need he be physically present in a state of which he is not a resident or citizen in order that he may initiate or maintain a personal action against a resident or citizen of that ether state for rights of action arising in, or for violations of laws committed within, the territorial jurisdiction of that other state. In this jurisdiction, no general law has come to our knowledge or notice which restricts the right of nonresident aliens to sue in our courts. It is not disputed that plaintiff's causes of action arose in, and that the defendants are within, our territorial jurisdiction. It is conceded by both parties that the law under which the instant case falls is silent on the matter of the right of an Alien to sue in our courts. On the other hand the particular law evidently availed of by the plaintiff in filing his complaint is Article 33 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:

        "In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only preponderance of evidence."

          The above-quoted provision of law does not make any distinction as to whether the "injured party." who may maintain an action for damages based on defamation, is a Filipino citizen or resident or an alien.

        “Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the court below for further proceeding consonant with this opinion”.

PACIFIC  V. DEL ROSARIO (1954)

[ G.R. No. L-7154, October 23, 1954 ]

FACTS:

           On September 2, 1952, Alfonsa Pelingon filed a claim for compensation for herself and her two minor children with the Workmen's Compensation Commission against the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., who refused to entertain the claim on the ground that said company was not the employer of the deceased husband of the claimant. On September 17, 1952, the Workmen's Compensation Commission, believing that the Pacific Far East Line, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, was not an agent of petitioner with authority to receive service of process, served notice of the claim on an official of said foreign corporation who in turn forwarded the notice to petitioner even if the latter was not an agent of, nor was it authorized to accept service of process in behalf of, said petitioner.

        On October 10, 1952, petitioner filed a special appearance with the Workmen's Compensation Commission for the sole purpose of asking for the dismissal of the claim on the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction over it because it is a foreign corporation not domiciled in this country, it is not licensed to engage and is not engaging in business therein, has no office in the Philippines, and is not represented by any agent authorized to receive summons or any other judicial process in its name and behalf.

ISSUE:

         Since petitioner is a private foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines in contemplation of the rule, can it be brought within the jurisdiction of our courts by serving the summons upon the agent who represented it in entering into the contract of employment with the deceased Luceno Pelingon?

RULING:

        It should be observed that petitioner is a corporation exclusively engaged in the business of carrying goods and passengers by sea between the territory of Guam and the Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands and for that purpose it was operating a fleet of vessels plying between those ports or territories. Petitioner has no property or office in the Philippines, nor is it licensed to do business in the Philippines. And the only act it did here was to secure the services of Luceno Pelingon to act as cook and chief steward in one of its vessels authorizing to that effect the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., a domestic corporation, and the contract of employment was entered into on July 18, 1951. It further appears that petitioner has never sent its ships to the Philippines, nor has it transported nor even solicited the transportation or passengers and cargoes to and from the Philippines. In other words, petitioner engaged the services of Pelingon not as part of the operation of its business but merely to employ him as member of the crew in one of its ships.

          That act apparently is an isolated one, incidental, or casual, and "not of a character to indicate a purpose to engage in business" within the meaning of the rule. It follows that, even if the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. may be considered as an agent of petitioner for the purposes of the contract of employment, service or process upon it cannot confer jurisdiction upon the Workmen's Compensation Commission because of the fact that petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines in contemplation of section 14, Rule 7, of our Rules of Court.

         “In view of the foregoing, we are persuaded to conclude, much as we sympathize with the claim of the widow, that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the petitioner and, therefore, the present proceedings cannot continue and should be dismissed”.

RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE (2008)

[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ]

FACTS:

          Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W. Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

          On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission, a suit against BMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G. Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegal termination and breach of employment contract.

          On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union. The Complaint named as defendants herein petitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.

          Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosed that per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI and RUST, denominated as “Special Sales Representative Agreement,” the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way of compulsory counterclaim.

          Petitioner asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS?

RULING:      

          On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.

          As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by its voluntary appearance in court.

          That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant only when the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is, after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

         Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most “convenient” or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

          Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.