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AQUINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995

Agapito A. Aquino, Petitioner

Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro, Respondent

FACTS:

Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the Constitution.

HELD:

In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of petitioner’s intention to reside in Makati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile.

Petitioner’s assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

OSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAID vs. LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT

G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967

JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, respondent-appellee.

Facts:

Refusal of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to record an Escritura de Adopcion executed in Madrid, Spain, is now challenged before this Court on appeal by registrant-adoptee from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila confirmatory of such refusal.

The disputed deed of adoption had its inception, thus: Prior to October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before the Court of First Instance of Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84 years of age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55 years, a citizen of the Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid, Spain. On that date, October 21, 1958, the court granted the application for adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority, once the judgment becomes final, to execute the corresponding adoption document. In compliance, on November 29, 1958, the notarial document of adoption — which embodies the court order of adoption — whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally adopted petitioner, was executed in Madrid.

In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion was, on December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the corresponding certificate of authentication.¹

The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. The Registrar, however, refused to register that document upon the ground that under Philippine law, adoption can only be had through judicial proceeding. And since the notarial document of adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to registration.

Issue:

Is the trial court correct in concluding that what is registrable is only adoption obtained through a judgment rendered by a Philippine court?

Ruling:

Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its own law. It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created under the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the substitution of the lex fori. At any rate, whatever may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and other persons interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil Code which, in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."

An adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by the laws of this country.

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. (DANGWA BUS COMPANY), and JAMES G. GAYOTvs. HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO,

G.R. No. L-22795 January 31, 1977

Facts:

On December 30, 1963, at Twin Peaks, Kennon Road, Tuba, Banquet Mountain Province, Dangwa bus was driven by James G. Gayot collided with Lawrence Heller who was then riding on his motorcycle. In the result of the collision, private respondent, Heller, sustained serious physical injuries, namely, a closed fracture of the left femur and a compound fracture of the left tibia, and his motorcycle was totally wrecked. Thereafter, he was confined at the USAF Hospital, Clark Air Base, Angeles, Pampanga. Thus, respondent, file a civil case for damages at Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch I, San Fernando and ruled in his favor.

Private respondent is an American citizen, an Airman First Class of the United States Air Force, and presently assigned and stationed at Clark Air Base Pampanga, Philippines; while the defendant James G. Gayot is a Filipino and a resident of Engineer's Hill, Baguio City and the other defendant Dangwa Bus Company with business address at Trinidad Valley, Banquet Mountain Province.

Issue:

Is residence synonymous to domicile in the law governing venue of actions of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling:

Rule 4 of Rules of Court Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.'

In Koh v. Court of Appeals, It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the exit in accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively ore permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

In case of Uytengsu vs. republic,There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary: domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

Respondent court having found that private respondent Lawrence Heller had his actual residence at Clark Air Base, Angeles Pampanga, at the time he filed his personal action against the petitioners, it did not, therefore, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. 

CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., Petitioner, vs. M/V "LOK MAHESHWARI," THE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA, and PORTSERV LIMITED

G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and principally owned by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.

On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services, petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.

On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.

Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V ‘Lok Maheshwari’" in the amount of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several demands were made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal fees.

On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.

On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.

On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneer’s letter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge the attachment.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to maritime lien under our laws on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?

RULING:

In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.

The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such single-factor methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional directive as to the statute’s reach, which jurisdiction’s law should be applied. The following factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under maritime law in general

The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescent’s insistence on the application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one – the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign – Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada.

RECIO & VAN DORN

NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy.