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RAYRAY V. CHAE KYUNG LEE (1966)

[ G. R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966 ]

LAZARO B. RAYRAY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CHAE KYUNG LEE, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

FACTS:

Plaintiff testified that he met the defendant in Pusan, Korea, sometime in 1952, where she was operating a night club; that they lived together from November 1952 to April 1955; that they were married in Pusan, Korea, on March 15, 1953, as attested to by their marriage certificate Exhibit D; that before the wedding she obtained the "police clearance" Exhibit A, written in Korean language, and dated February 16, 1953, which was necessary in order that she could contract marriage; that on June 30, 1953, he proceeded to India and left the defendant, then in advanced stage of pregnancy, in Korea; that in October, 1953, she joined him in India, bringing with her said Exhibit A, and its translation into English, Exhibit B; that he then noticed that, on February 16, 1953, defendant was already married, according to said Exhibit B; that as he confronted the defendant with the contents of this document, her reply was that it is not unusual for a Korean girl to marry twice in Korea; that when he inquired about her status on March 15, 1953, defendant confided to him that she had lived with about two (2) Americans and a Korean, adding, however, that there was no impediment to her contracting marriage with him; and that, later on, they were separated and her whereabouts are now unknown to him.

Plaintiff Lazaro Rayray seeks the annulment of his marriage to defendant Chae Kyung Lee. Inasmuch as, the latter's whereabouts is unknown, and she was formerly a resident of Pusan, Korea, summons was served by publication, as provided in the Rules of Court. Thereafter, plaintiff moved that defendant be declared in default, she not having filed an answer.

ISSUE:

WON Philippine court has jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, it having been solemnized in Seoul, Korea.

RULING:

Yes.

In order that a given case could be validly decided by a court of justice, it must have jurisdiction over: (1) the subject-matter of the litigation; (2) the person of the parties therein; and (3) in actions in rem or quasi-in-rem, the res.

The subject-matter of the present case is the annulment of plaintiff's marriage to the defendant, which is within the jurisdiction of our courts of first instance,[2] and, in Manila, of its Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations.[3]

The same acquired jurisdiction over plaintiff herein by his submission thereto in consequence of the filing of the complaint herein.[4] Defendant was placed under the jurisdiction of said court, upon the service of summons by publication.[5]

This is an action in rem, for it concerns the status of the parties herein, and status affects or binds the whole world. The res in the present case is the relation between said parties, or their marriage tie.[6] Jurisdiction over the same depends upon the nationality or domicile of the parties, not the place of celebration of marriage, or the locus celebrationis.[7] plaintiff herein is a citizen of the Philippines, domiciled therein. His status is, therefore, subject to our jurisdiction, on both counts. True that defendant was and - under plaintiff's theory -still is a non-resident alien. But, this fact does not deprive the lower court of its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of her marriage to plaintiff herein.

The prevailing rule is, accordingly, that a court has jurisdiction over the res, in an action for annulment of marriage, provided, at least, one of the parties is domiciled in, or a national of, the forum.[8] Since plaintiff is a Filipino, domiciled in the Philippines, it follows that the lower court had jurisdiction over the res, in addition to its jurisdiction over the subject-matter and the parties. In other words, it could validly inquire into the legality of the marriage between the parties herein.

ELLIS V. REPUBLIC (1963)

[ G. R. No. L-16922, April 30, 1963 ]

IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE. MARVIN G. ELLIS AND GLORIA C. ELLIS, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

FACTS:

Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September 8, 1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa&mdashan institution for unwed mothers and their babies—stating that she (the mother) could not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's) family.

Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on. January 14, I960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before, or, to be exact, in 1953.

ISSUE:

Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose.

RULING:

No.

Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:

"The following cannot adopt:

* * * * * * *

"(4) Non-resident aliens;"

* * * * * * *

This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we may sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain, unless it has jurisdiction, not only over tho subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.

Inasmuch s petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines,—and, hence, non-resident aliens—we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over their status, under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory. ln any event, whether the above-quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over the, res, or merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners it.

G.R. No. 155014 November 11, 2005

CRESCENT PETROLEUM, LTD., Petitioner,

vs.

M/V "LOK MAHESHWARI," THE SHIPPING CORPORATION OF INDIA, and PORTSERV LIMITED and/or TRANSMAR SHIPPING, INC., Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondent M/V "Lok Maheshwari" (Vessel) is an oceangoing vessel of Indian registry that is owned by respondent Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of India and principally owned by the Government of India. It was time-chartered by respondent SCI to Halla Merchant Marine Co. Ltd. (Halla), a South Korean company. Halla, in turn, sub-chartered the Vessel through a time charter to Transmar Shipping, Inc. (Transmar). Transmar further sub-chartered the Vessel to Portserv Limited (Portserv). Both Transmar and Portserv are corporations organized and existing under the laws of Canada.

On or about November 1, 1995, Portserv requested petitioner Crescent Petroleum, Ltd. (Crescent), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Canada that is engaged in the business of selling petroleum and oil products for the use and operation of oceangoing vessels, to deliver marine fuel oils (bunker fuels) to the Vessel. Petitioner Crescent granted and confirmed the request through an advice via facsimile dated November 2, 1995. As security for the payment of the bunker fuels and related services, petitioner Crescent received two (2) checks in the amounts of US$100,000.00 and US$200,000.00. Thus, petitioner Crescent contracted with its supplier, Marine Petrobulk Limited (Marine Petrobulk), another Canadian corporation, for the physical delivery of the bunker fuels to the Vessel.

On or about November 4, 1995, Marine Petrobulk delivered the bunker fuels amounting to US$103,544 inclusive of barging and demurrage charges to the Vessel at the port of Pioneer Grain, Vancouver, Canada. The Chief Engineer Officer of the Vessel duly acknowledged and received the delivery receipt. Marine Petrobulk issued an invoice to petitioner Crescent for the US$101,400.00 worth of the bunker fuels. Petitioner Crescent issued a check for the same amount in favor of Marine Petrobulk, which check was duly encashed.

Having paid Marine Petrobulk, petitioner Crescent issued a revised invoice dated November 21, 1995 to "Portserv Limited, and/or the Master, and/or Owners, and/or Operators, and/or Charterers of M/V ‘Lok Maheshwari’" in the amount of US$103,544.00 with instruction to remit the amount on or before December 1, 1995. The period lapsed and several demands were made but no payment was received. Also, the checks issued to petitioner Crescent as security for the payment of the bunker fuels were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. As a consequence, petitioner Crescent incurred additional expenses of US$8,572.61 for interest, tracking fees, and legal fees.

On May 2, 1996, while the Vessel was docked at the port of Cebu City, petitioner Crescent instituted before the RTC of Cebu City an action "for a sum of money with prayer for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary attachment" against respondents Vessel and SCI, Portserv and/or Transmar.

On May 3, 1996, the trial court issued a writ of attachment against the Vessel with bond at P2,710,000.00. Petitioner Crescent withdrew its prayer for a temporary restraining order and posted the required bond.

On May 18, 1996, summonses were served to respondents Vessel and SCI, and Portserv and/or Transmar through the Master of the Vessel. On May 28, 1996, respondents Vessel and SCI, through Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (Pioneer), filed an urgent ex-parte motion to approve Pioneer’s letter of undertaking, to consider it as counter-bond and to discharge the attachment. On May 29, 1996, the trial court granted the motion; thus, the letter of undertaking was approved as counter-bond to discharge the attachment.

ISSUE:

Whether the Philippine court has or will exercise jurisdiction and entitled to maritime lien under our laws on foreign vessel docked on Philippine port and supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port?

RULING:

In a suit to establish and enforce a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a vessel in a foreign port, whether such lien exists, or whether the court has or will exercise jurisdiction, depends on the law of the country where the supplies were furnished, which must be pleaded and proved.

The Lauritzen-Romero-Rhoditis trilogy of cases, which replaced such single-factor methodologies as the law of the place of supply. The multiple-contact test to determine, in the absence of a specific Congressional directive as to the statute’s reach, which jurisdiction’s law should be applied. The following factors were considered: (1) place of the wrongful act; (2) law of the flag; (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured; (4) allegiance of the defendant shipowner; (5) place of contract; (6) inaccessibility of foreign forum; and (7) law of the forum. This is applicable not only to personal injury claims arising under the Jones Act but to all matters arising under maritime law in general

The Court cannot sustain petitioner Crescent’s insistence on the application of P.D. No. 1521 or the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978 and hold that a maritime lien exists. Out of the seven basic factors listed in the case of Lauritzen, Philippine law only falls under one – the law of the forum. All other elements are foreign – Canada is the place of the wrongful act, of the allegiance or domicile of the injured and the place of contract; India is the law of the flag and the allegiance of the defendant shipowner. Applying P.D. No. 1521,a maritime lien exists would not promote the public policy behind the enactment of the law to develop the domestic shipping industry. Opening up our courts to foreign suppliers by granting them a maritime lien under our laws even if they are not entitled to a maritime lien under their laws will encourage forum shopping. In light of the interests of the various foreign elements involved, it is clear that Canada has the most significant interest in this dispute. The injured party is a Canadian corporation, the sub-charterer which placed the orders for the supplies is also Canadian, the entity which physically delivered the bunker fuels is in Canada, the place of contracting and negotiation is in Canada, and the supplies were delivered in Canada.

MIJARES V. RANADA (2005)

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. NO. 139325, April 12, 2005 ]

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, AND JOEL C. LAMANGAN IN THEIR BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE CLASS PLAINTIFFS IN CLASS ACTION NO. MDL 840, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 137, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY, AND THE ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, THROUGH ITS COURT APPOINTED LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES IN CLASS ACTION MDL 840, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF HAWAII, NAMELY: IMELDA R. MARCOS AND FERDINAND MARCOS, JR., RESPONDENTS.

Facts:

Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al.*, all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals.

As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, §7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a MTD alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid.

Issue: Whether or not the amount paid by the Petitioners is the proper filing fee.

 

Ruling:

Yes, but on a different basis—amount merely corresponds to the same amount required for “other actions not involving property”. RTC Makati erred in concluding that the filing fee should be computed on the basis of the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation. The Petitioner’s Complaint was lodged against the Estate of Marcos but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court. However, the Petitioners err in stating that the Final Judgment is incapable of pecuniary estimation because it is so capable. On this point, Petitioners state that this might lead to an instance wherein a first level court (MTC, MeTC, etc.) would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. Under the B.P.129, such courts are not vested with such jurisdiction. §33 of B.P.129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights over property or a sum of money. But here, the subject matter is the foreign judgment itself. §16 of B.P.129 reveals that the complaint for enforcement of judgment even if capable of pecuniary estimation would fall under the jurisdiction of the RTCs. Thus, the Complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimations but at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of §7(a) of Rule 141. What governs the proper computation of the filing fees over Complaints for the enforcement of foreign judgments is §7(b)(3), involving “other actions not involving property.”

MONTALBAN V. MAXIMO (1968)

[ G.R. No. L-22997, March 15, 1968 ]

PABLO C. MONTALBAN, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. GERARDO MAXIMO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

FACTS:

Chronologically, following are the events that spawned the present case:

August 15, 1958. Plaintiffs commenced suit[1] against Fr. Gerardo Maximo who, according to the complaint, was residing at the parish church at Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal. Plaintiffs' cause of action for damages sprang from a motor vehicle accident which occurred at Padre Faura St., Manila, on December 16, 1957. Paul Hershell Montalban, son of plaintiffs, suffered injuries.

August 15, 1958. On this same day that the complaint was filed, summons was served on defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo at the parish church of Concepcion, Malabon, Rizal, through Fr. Arsenio Bautista - a priest in the same parish church.

August 23, 1958. Fr. Arsenio Bautista sent a letter (dated August 21) to Macario M. Ofilada, Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila, informing him that defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo left for Europe on August 7, and "will be back on the first week of November." Actually, Fr. Maximo returned from abroad "about the second week of October, 1958."

September 20, 1958. The lower court declared defendant in default, on plaintiffs' motion of September 13, 1958.

June 8, 1959. Upon plaintiffs' evidence, the court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff.

December 16, 1959. Plaintiffs themselves wrote defendant Fr. Gerardo Maximo, at the Malabon Catholic Church, informing the latter of the lower court's decision, quoting therein the dispositive part of the decision just transcribed, requesting prompt compliance there¬with and suggesting that he communicate with or personally see their lawyer, Jose W. Diokno, at the latter's address, 332 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila.

December 20, 1959. Defendant, through his legal counsel, Dr. Nicanor T. Santos, answered the foregoing letter expressing regret that he could not comply with plaintiffs' request, because he (defendant) was not aware of the said civil case, and that, in the criminal action arising out of the same incident, said defendant was acquitted by the Municipal Court of Manila.[3]

January 14 1960. Deputy Sheriff Liberato C. Manalo of Rizal notified defendant of the issuance of the writ of execution dated January 7, 1960, and demanded payment of the amount set forth therein. The Sheriff's return to the writ shows that in response to such demand, defendant alleged that he was then "financially hard up,"[4] and that the Sheriff found no property that could be subject to execution.

January 30, 1962. An alias writ of execution was issued. Copy thereof was received by defendant on February 9, 1962.

February 1, 1962. The Deputy Sheriff attached and levied on a residential house located in Caloocan City and purportedly belonging to defendant.

February 20, 1962. Two years and two months after defendant admittedly learned of the lower court's decision from counsel for plaintiffs herein, said defendant, by counsel, filed a verified motion in the same case praying for the annulment of the entire proceedings. His ground is this: Summons was not duly served upon him "as provided under Sec. 7, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court";[5] accordingly, the lower court "did not acquire jurisdiction over his person"; and "the trial and decision by default" are "null and void."[6]

March 3 1962. The court denied this motion.

March 24 1962. Defendant's move to reconsider was rejected by the court.

Hence, this appeal from the orders of March 3 and March 24, 1962, duly certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals.

September 2, 1965. After the case was submitted for decision, defendant's lawyer informed this Court of the death of defendant on August 1, 1965.

October 18, 1967. Following extensive efforts to have the deceased defendant substituted by any of his heirs or the executor or administrator of his estate, which were to no avail, this Court appointed the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila, representative of the deceased defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether summons in a suit in personam against a resident of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom may be validly effected by substituted service under Section 8, Rule 14 (formerly Section 8, Rule 7) of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

For, plaintiffs make the point that even with defendant temporarily abroad, substituted service is valid under Section 8 by leaving a copy of the summons "at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein."

"SEC. 8. Substituted service. - If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof."

There should be no doubt, therefore, that in suits in personam, courts have jurisdiction over residents temporarily out of the country.

This brings us to the question of procedural due process. Sub¬stituted service such as one contemplated in Section 8 upon a tempo¬rarily absent resident, it has been held, is wholly adequate to meet the requirements of due process.[15] The constitutional requirement of due process exacts that the service be such as may be reasonably expected to give the notice desired. Once the service provided by the rules reasonably accomplishes that end, the requirement of justice is answered; the traditional notions of fair play are satisfied; due process is served.

When the framers of our Rules adapted Section 8, it is to be implied that they intended to give the provision the same meaning shaped out by the jurisprudence of the jurisdiction from whence it was patterned. Section 8 is to be viewed in the same context it is understood in the American legal system. The word "defendant" in that provision is to be construed as including any resident of this country. By comparative construction, Section 8 is to be applied to all resident defendants - without distinction as to whether he is physically present in this country or not.

Chief Justice Moran shares this view. Commenting on Section 18, Rule 14, he states: "Since the defendant is residing in the Philippines, jurisdiction over his person may be acquired by Philippine courts by substituted service of summons under section 8. But extraterritorial service is allowed also by leave of court according to the above provision [Section 18]."[19] Justice Martin regards the word "residence" in Section 8 as "the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the state at the time."[20]

It is immaterial then that defendant does not in fact receive actual notice. This will not affect the validity of the service.[21] Accordingly, the defendant may be charged by a judgment in personam as a result of legal proceedings upon a method of service which is not personal, "which in fact may not become actual notice to him," and which may be accomplished in his lawful absence from the country.[22] For, the rules do not require that papers be served on defendant per¬sonally or a showing that the papers were delivered to defendant by the person with whom they were left.[23]

A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwelling where he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and where he is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands of one who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary to protect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance that may affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or with his business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question that affects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in court against him, he cannot in justice raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of our courts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summoned at his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.

There is the temporarily absent defendant who was a parish priest. Summons upon him was served upon Fr. Bautista who lived in the same convent where defendant resided. Fr. Bautista, we must assume, is a responsible person. Service upon him is effective.

In practical terms, we perceive that - in suits in personam the more circuitous procedure delineated in Sections 17 and 18 is resorted to by a plaintiff if defendant's dwelling house or residence or place of business in this country is not known; or, if known, service upon him cannot be had thereat upon the terms of Section 8. Here, since personal service is impossible, resort to substituted service becomes a necessity. A comparison between the service in Section 8 and that in Sections 17 and 18 is beside the point. They both provide for substituted service.