nazario digest

LIM V. ASAICHI KAGAWA

[ G.R. NO. L-8587, MARCH 24, 1960 ]

FACTS:

The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, Manila, with a total area of 29,151 sq. m., which, after the last world war, was found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan. For such reason, the said Custodian, on March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2; and subsequently under the same statue, on Lots 3 and 4 on July 6, 1948. Two formal agreements were then executed, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4; whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon indemnifying the U.S.

On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed on November 15, 1948 a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents.

ISSUE: Has the action for the recovery of real property prescribed stripping the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter?

RULING:

The appellate court's order of dismissal, with respect to plaintiff's claim for damages against the defendant Attorney General of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines must be upheld based upon the principle that a foreign state or its government cannot be sued without its consent.

With respect to the recovery or return of the properties vested, section 33 of the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended, provides:

"SEC. 33. Return of property; notice; institution of suits, computation of time.—No return may be made pursuant to section 9 or 32 unless notice of claim has been, filed: (a) in the case of any property or interest acquired by the United States prior to December 18, 1941, by August 9, 1948; or (b) in the case of any property or interest acquired by the United States on or after December 18, 1941, by April 30, 1949, or two years from the vesting of the property or interest in respect of "which the claim is made, whichever is later.

Lots 1 and 2 were vested by the Alien Property Custodian on March 14, 1946". The two-year period, therefore, within which to file a suit for their return expired on March 14, 1948. The claim filed by plaintiff with the Philippine Alien Property Administration on November 15, 1948 obviously could not toll the two-year period that had already expired on March 14, 1948.

Regarding Lots 3 and 4, these lots were vested only on July 6, 1948 and consequently the two-year period within which to file the action for their recovery expired on July 7, 1950. But in computing that two-year period, the time during which plaintiff's claim with the Philippine Alien Property Administration was pending— from November 16, 1948 when the claim was filed to March 7, 1950 when it was disallowed—should be excluded. The complaint therefore filed on November 13, 1950 is well within the prescribed period. Hence the case on said lots is hereby remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. 

WOLFGANG ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

FACTS:

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition⁵ for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the children was granted to the father.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded?

RULING: On the first issue, as a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).

Anent the second issue, we hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings.

PILAPIL V. ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella, was born on 1980. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany on January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. On January 15, 1986, the local court of Germany promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law, said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983".

ISSUE: Does the petitioner have a legal interest to file an action for the crimes against adultery against the respondent?

RULING:

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materiawith ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned ²³ in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.