kendra espiritu

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan.

Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy

RULING:

A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.  Petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence

Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:

Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married before a Catholic chaplain and planned to elope. The elopement did not materialize because Vicenta’s mother discovered such marriage. Her parents asked the advice of one Father Reynes and subsequently agreed to recelebrate the marriage. However, Vicenta refused to proceed with the ceremony because a letter from the students of San Carlos College disclosed that Pastor and their matchmaker; Pacita Noel had an amorous relationship. Vicenta left for the States, acquired a foreign divorce and married an American, Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She sought for a divorce from Tenchavez in 1950 and sought ecclesiastical release from her marriage to Tenchavez in 1954. Escano claims that state recognition should be accorded the Church's disapproval of her marriage with Tenchavez.. Escano argued that her second marriage deserves the law’s recognition and protection over the other since it fits the concept of a marriage as a social institution because it was publicly contracted, recognized by both civil and ecclesiastical authorities, and blessed by three children. She also contends that the court has no jurisdiction over her.

The husband filed a complaint against the parents for having dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband and alienating her affections against the Roman Catholic Church for having decreed annulment. The parents filed a counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE:

1.)    Whether or not the marriage between Tenchavez and Escano still subsists in lieau of the divorce

2.)    Whether or not there is an action for alienation of affections against parents

RULING:

The marriage between Tenchavez and Escano in lieau of the divorce will not subsist. There is no proof of malice and the parents themselves suggested that the marriage be celebrated again. Vicenta appeared to have acted independently and being of age, entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decision be respected. Their marriage was valid. However, it entitles Tenchavez a decree of legal separation and sentence Escano to pay the amount of 25 000 pesos in favor of appellant for damages and attorney’s fees and Pastor Tenchavez to pay Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys.

With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the matter and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot be applied in the Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicenta’s refusal to perform her wifely duties and her denial of consortium and her desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to damages. When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, 45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive:  filing of suit may have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured their reputation or otherwise prejudiced them.

G.R. No. L-34259 March 21, 1931

Intestate Estate of the late E. Randolph Hix.
ANNIE COUSINS HIX, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
A. W. FLUEMER, opponent-appellee.

FACTS:

E. Randolph Hix was born in Union, South Carolina and engaged in private work as consulting engineer and contractor. He took an examination and received an appointment as coal expert for the Philippine Government during the year 1910. While living in Manila in 1912, he met the appellant and married her in Shanghai, China and domiciled in Manila. A son was born of this union in Boston, Massachusetts, on July 1, 1915, named Preston Randolph Hix, while she was in the United States where she had gone on the month of May of the same year to visit her family and the mother and sister of her husband. The appellant returned to Manila in November, 1916, and continued to live with the deceased as husband and wife.

On December 7, 1922, the appellant instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against her husband, E. Randolph Hix, for the purpose of compelling him to provide adequate support for herself and her son, Preston Randolf Hix. During the month of December, 1922, while the proceedings in said case were pending, he left for West Virginia, leaving his wife and child in Manila, and his business in the hands of his employee, A. W. Fluemer, the opponent and appellee, for the purpose of residing there and suing for a divorce..

           

ISSUE:

1.)    Whether the Circuit Court of Randolph County in West Virginia acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for divorce filed by the opponent and appelle

2.)    Whether the Circuit Court acquired jurisdiction to render a valid and binding judgment against the petitioner and appellant

RULING:

            One of the conditions for the validity of a decree of absolute divorce is that the court granting it has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, and to this end the plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith, and for the length of time fixed by the law, in the state in which it was granted. E. Randolph Hix was domiciled in the City of Manila where he lived apart from his wife and child, by mutual consent, and here he had his business. He removed to the State of West Virginia leaving his aforesaid wife and child and his business behind, for the purpose of obtaining an absolute divorce, which he did in 1925, returning in the year 1927 to reside in the City of Manila, and continuing his business.

            Since E. Randolph Hix was not a bona fide resident of the State of West Virginia, the divorce decree he obtained from the Circuit Court of Randolph County, is null and void, said court having failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter. But even if his residence had been taken up in good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the summons made by publication, she not having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel, did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person.

 G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG, Respondents.

FACTS:

Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig, both Filipinos twice on May 16, 1968 in the Philippines. The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems and decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. On April 27, 1984, the couple executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws.

On July 14, 1984, Tristan married Elmar O. Perez in the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

  

ISSUE:

Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be intervenor in Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife.

RULING:

No, Perez has no legal interest. Petitioner’s claim lacks merit and has no basis because she was never the legal wife of Tristan.When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity.

Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO,  respondents.

FACTS:

            Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, on May 18, 1989, the Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of the spouses. Three years therefrom, Rederick became an Australian citizen.

            On January 12, 1994, Rederick contracted another marriage to Grace J. Garcia, a Filipina, in Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

            Grace filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Rederick’s maiirage with Editha Samson.

ISSUES:

1.)    Whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven

2.)    Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner

RULING:

The petition is partly meritorious. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.

The nullity of Rederick’s marriage with Editha was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the RTC of Cabanatuan City to receive evidence that will conclusively prove respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner and failure thereto, declare the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy.

BY:

 Ken Kendra V. Espiritu