bala

Estrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)

 AM
No.
P‐02‐1651,
August
4,
2003,
June
20,
2006

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.  Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary.  On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.  Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.   According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.  After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation.  Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.  Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.       

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.

The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency.  “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override respondent’s plea of religious freedom.  Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.  The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom.  Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “compelling state interest” test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.     

Gandiongco vs Penaranda

GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987

FACTS:

Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case.  Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband.  She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge.  Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him.  He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.

HELD:

Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect.  A civil action for legal separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.  Such civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse.  Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.

Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the judge.   If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.

Republic vs CA and Molina

Republic vs. CA and Molina

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity.  The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances.  In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged.  Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child.  Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.  What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities.  It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness.  Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.  The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.  In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

·                     burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

·                     root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

·                     such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

·                     such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage

·                     such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code

·                     decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

·                     court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

Te vs Te

Te vs. Te

GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college.  Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996.  It was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless.  Her persistence, however, made him relent.  They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license.  Edward was prohibited from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle.  After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents.  Edward’s parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode.  In June 1996, she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.  Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.

 Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as where to live).  As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others.  Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contra

MALANG vs. MOSON, ET AL.

GR # 119064, August 22, 2000

FACTS: 

Decedent Hadji Abdula Malang,a  Muslim, had 4 wives at the time he acquired the subject properties. Under Islamic law, the regime of property relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlements or any other contract (A.38, PD 1083).

Petitioner, a Muslim and the decedent’s 4^th wife, alleged that the properties are her conjugal property with the decedent since they got married prior to the enactment of PD1083. Thus, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains applies to them in accordance with the Civil Code. The Shari’a District Court held that Islamic law is applicable and thus, the properties are not conjugal since under Islamic laws, the regime of relationship is complete separation of property, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary in the marriage settlement/ any other contract. In this appeal, petitioner contends that the NCC is applicable. Thus, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. 

ISSUE:

1.      Which of the several marriages was validly and legally existing at the time of the opening of the succession of Hadji Abdula when he died in 1993?

2.      There being a dispute between the petitioner and the oppositors as regards the heirship of the children begotten from different marriages, who among the surviving children are legitimate and who are illegitimate?

3. What properties constituted the estate of Hadji Abdula at the time of his death on December 18,  1993? 

HELD:

The validity of the marriages in the case at bar is determined by the NCC. Thus the NCC determines and governs the property relations of the marriage in the instant case. This is because at the time of the celebration of the marriages, the Civil Code was the only law on marriage relations, including property relations between spouses whether Muslim or non-Muslim.  The Family Code which made substantial amendments to the NCC particularly to property acquired from and after August 3, 1988 is also relevant.  Which law would govern depends upon: (1) when the marriages took place; (2) whether the parties lived together as husband and wife; and (3) when and how the subject properties were acquired. A.144, NCC requires that the man and woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Thus the co-ownership it contemplates is not applicable to Hadji’s marriages celebrated subsequent to a valid and legally existing marriage, since from the NCC’s point of view; Hadji is not capacitated to marry. The law presumes, absent any proof to the contrary, that property acquired during the subsistence of a valid marriage- and in the NCC, there can be one at any given time- is conjugal property of such subsisting marriage.