virna silao 2

ELLIS V. REPUBLIC (1963)

[ G. R. No. L-16922, April 30, 1963 ]

IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE. MARVIN G. ELLIS AND GLORIA C. ELLIS, PETITIONERS, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR AND APPELLANT.

FACTS:

Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Francisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September 8, 1949, he married Gloria C. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959 at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa&mdashan institution for unwed mothers and their babies—stating that she (the mother) could not take care of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's) family.

Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on. January 14, I960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga, where both lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before, or, to be exact, in 1953.

ISSUE:

Whether or not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose.

RULING:

No.

Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that:

"The following cannot adopt:

* * * * * * *

"(4) Non-resident aliens;"

* * * * * * *

This legal provision is too clear to require interpretation. No matter how much we may sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms, which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to adopt anybody in the Philippines.

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain, unless it has jurisdiction, not only over tho subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.

Inasmuch s petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines,—and, hence, non-resident aliens—we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over their status, under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory. ln any event, whether the above-quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over the, res, or merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners it.

LWV CONSTRUCTION V. DUPO (2009)

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 172342, July 13, 2009 ]

LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. MARCELO B. DUPO, RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

Petitioner, a domestic corporation which recruits Filipino workers, hired respondent as Civil Structural Superintendent to work in Saudi Arabia for its principal, Mohammad Al-Mojil Group/Establishment (MMG). On February 26, 1992, respondent signed his first overseas employment contract, renewable after one year. It was renewed five times on the following dates: May 10, 1993, November 16, 1994, January 22, 1996, April 14, 1997, and March 26, 1998. All were fixed-period contracts for one year. The sixth and last contract stated that respondent's employment starts upon reporting to work and ends when he leaves the work site. Respondent left Saudi Arabia on April 30, 1999 and arrived in the Philippines on May 1, 1999.

On May 28, 1999, respondent informed MMG, through the petitioner, that he needs to extend his vacation because his son was hospitalized. He also sought a promotion with salary adjustment.^[3] In reply, MMG informed respondent that his promotion is subject to management's review; that his services are still needed; that he was issued a plane ticket for his return flight to Saudi Arabia on May 31, 1999; and that his decision regarding his employment must be made within seven days, otherwise, MMG "will be compelled to cancel [his] slot." On July 6, 1999, respondent resigned.

Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, an employee who rendered at least five (5) years in a company within the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, is entitled to the so-called long service award which is known to others as longevity pay of at least one half month pay for every year of service. In excess of five years an employee is entitled to one month pay for every year of service. In both cases inclusive of all benefits and allowances.

ISSUE:

1.      WON  respondent is entitled to a service award or longevity pay of US$12,640.33 under the provisions of the Saudi Labor Law; and

2.      WON prescription barred respondent's claim for service award as the complaint was filed one year and seven months after the sixth contract ended.

RULING:

1.      Respondent's service award under Article 87 of the Saudi Labor Law has already been paid.
Article 87 clearly grants a service award. It reads:

Article 87

Where the term of a labor contract concluded for a specified period comes to an end or where the employer cancels a contract of unspecified period, the employer shall pay to the workman an award for the period of his service to be computed on the basis of half a month's pay for each of the first five years and one month's pay for each of the subsequent years. The last rate of pay shall be taken as basis for the computation of the award. For fractions of a year, the workman shall be entitled to an award which is proportionate to his service period during that year. Furthermore, the workman shall be entitled to the service award provided for at the beginning of this article in the following cases:

A. If he is called to military service.

B. If a workman resigns because of marriage or childbirth.

C. If the workman is leaving the work as a result of a force majeure beyond his control.(Emphasis supplied.)

2.      On the matter of prescription, however, we cannot agree with petitioner that respondent's action has prescribed under Article 13 of the Saudi Labor Law. What applies is Article 291 of our Labor Code which reads:

ART. 291. Money claims. -- All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

x x x x

In Cadalin v. POEA's Administrator,^[27] we held that Article 291 covers all money claims from employer-employee relationship and is broader in scope than claims arising from a specific law. It is not limited to money claims recoverable under the Labor Code, but applies also to claims of overseas contract workers.

Thus, in our considered view, respondent's complaint was filed well within the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of our Labor Code. This point, however, has already been mooted by our finding that respondent's service award had been paid, albeit the payroll termed such payment as severance pay.

the final exam

Final Examination in Conflict of Laws

Saturday, 10 am

Rule on the issue/s posed by the given facts of the case.

1. Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.  Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary.  On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.  Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.   According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.  After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation.  Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.  Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.       

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct” and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.

2. Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition⁵ for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the children was granted to the father.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded?

3. On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. LapuzSy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.In his second amended answer to the petition, respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. LapuzSy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.

Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O. LapuzSy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.

ISSUES:

1.   Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?

2.       If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights?

4. Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case.  Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband.  She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge.  Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him.  He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage.

5. On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner filed civil case against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed criminal case against petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of support pendente lite.

ISSUES:1.     Does conviction for concubinage be secured first  before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed?

2.       Did the respondent judge gravely abuse his discretion on the alleged partiality in ordering the payment of support to the wife pendente lite. ?

6. Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals On February 8, 1931 – Respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino. Then on September 15, 1943 – Marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years Arturo Tolentio married Pular Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they have 3 children.  Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed.  Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters). Trial Court ruled that Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

Issues: 1.      Whether or Not the petitioner’s cause of action has already prescribed

2.      Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.

7. Vicente and Rebecca are husband and wife. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar TanchiongMakapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.

Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican court granted the divorce and the same court settled the couple’s property relations pursuant to an agreement they executed.

Meanwhile, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage. Rebecca, however, later moved and secured approvalof the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid.

8. On 7 February 1958 plaintiff Lavern R. Dilweg, a nonresident American citizen, through counsel, instituted the complaint at bar consisting of six causes of action against defendants Robert O. Phillips, Inocentes G. Dineros, and Isaac S. Eceta, claiming civil damages arising out of alleged libelous and defamatory statements uttered and published in the Philippines by the latter. On 24 February 1958 the first two named defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff interposed an opposition thereto on 7 March 1958.                         

          On 11 May 1961 the trial court issued an order, which is the subject of the present appeal, the pertinent portion of which is as follows:

         "This action is one for damages by reason of alleged libelous statements uttered in the Philippines by the defendants against the plaintiff. In other words, it is an action bared on a tort or act, which under the law of the Philippines, is defined as a criminal offense. At the time the said libelous statements were uttered, the plaintiff was in Washington, D.C. where, he was and has always been a resident. There is no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff has ever been in the Philippines or has resided at anytime therein.

        "The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff by the filing of his complaint. It was contended that as the plaintiff therein has never been a resident of the Philippines, the courts of this country have not acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of his action bared on a contract which was executed in the State of New York,USA.

         The Court has come to conclusion that in order that it may validly try this case, it must have jurisdiction not only over the persons of the parties and over the subject matter and the plaintiff must be a resident within the territorial of this Court in order that jurisdiction over his person can be acquired, otherwise the Court will not be able to render a valid judgment against him.

ISSUE:

        Whether or not our Philippine courts can rightfully refuse to assume jurisdiction over a personal action instituted by a nonresident alien who is not within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts?

9.   On September 2, 1952, Alfonsa Pelingon filed a claim for compensation for herself and her two minor children with the Workmen's Compensation Commission against the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., who refused to entertain the claim on the ground that said company was not the employer of the deceased husband of the claimant. On September 17, 1952, the Workmen's Compensation Commission, believing that the Pacific Far East Line, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, was not an agent of petitioner with authority to receive service of process, served notice of the claim on an official of said foreign corporation who in turn forwarded the notice to petitioner even if the latter was not an agent of, nor was it authorized to accept service of process in behalf of, said petitioner.

        On October 10, 1952, petitioner filed a special appearance with the Workmen's Compensation Commission for the sole purpose of asking for the dismissal of the claim on the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction over it because it is a foreign corporation not domiciled in this country, it is not licensed to engage and is not engaging in business therein, has no office in the Philippines, and is not represented by any agent authorized to receive summons or any other judicial process in its name and behalf.

ISSUE:

         Since petitioner is a private foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines in contemplation of the rule, can it be brought within the jurisdiction of our courts by serving the summons upon the agent who represented it in entering into the contract of employment with the deceased Luceno Pelingon?

10. The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, Manila, with a total area of 29,151 sq. m., which, after the last world war, was found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan. For such reason, the said Custodian, on March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2; and subsequently under the same statue, on Lots 3 and 4 on July 6, 1948. Two formal agreements were then executed, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4; whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon indemnifying the U.S.

On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed on November 15, 1948 a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents.

ISSUE: Has the action for the recovery of real property prescribed stripping the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter?

End of the Examination