case digest submitted by brix bala

Gerbert R. Corpuz

VS.

Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas

And the

Solicitor General G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, THIRD DIVISION, (Brion,J.)

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsistsunder the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of theCanadian divorce decree by a competent judicial court in view of NSO CircularNo.4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC.However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

HELD:

Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED.

The Supreme Court qualifies the above conclusion that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens -with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert's petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after itsauthenticity and conformity with the alien's national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner's presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court

TOLENTINO V. DAVID (1988)

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-41427 June 10, 1988

CONSTANCIA C. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO DAVID, respondents.

Facts:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals On February 8, 1931 – Respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino. Then on September 15, 1943 – Marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years Arturo Tolentio married Pular Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they have 3 children.  Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed.  Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters). Trial Court ruled that Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court.

Issues:

1.      Whether or Not the petitioner’s cause of action has already prescribed?

2.      Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.

Held :

Art. 1150 (CC) The time for prescription of all kinds of actions, when there in no special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they may be brought also, Art. 1149 Period of prescription is 5 years from the right of action accrues. The action has long prescribed because she married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950; she acquired knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino in 1951.

She should have filed the case after she obtained knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the surname Tolentino.  The case was filed on November 23, 1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge.

Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced woman may continue to use the surname of her husband because there are no provisions for divorce under Philippine law.

There was a commentary by Tolentino with regards to Art. 370 of the CC: the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the husband’s surname.  She cannot be prevented from using it; but neither can she restrain others from using it. Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates annulment while the present case refers to absolute divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties.  Effect of divorce more akin to death of the spouse where the deceased woman is continued to be referred to as Mrs. Of the husband even if he has remarried.

If the appeal would be granted the respondent would encounter problems because she was able to prove that she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino.  Petitioner failed to show the she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right. There is no usurpation of the petitioner’s name and surname.  Usurpation implies injury to the interests of the owner of the name. 

Leouel Santos vs Court of Appeals & Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.

Article 36: Psychological Incapacity

Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julia’s parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of Julia’s parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julia’s parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouel’s opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed to nullify their marriage due to Julia’s psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julia’s failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Julia attacked the complaint and she said that it is Leouel who is incompetent. The prosecutor ascertained that there is no collusion between the two. Leouel’s petition is however denied by the lower and appellate court.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar?

HELD: 

Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term “psychological incapacity”, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term “psychological incapacity” defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.

Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

REPUBLIC V. MOLINA

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity.  The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances.  In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged.  Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child.  Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE:

 Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid.  What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities.  It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness.  Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.  The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.  In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

• Burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff.
• Root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined.
• Such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage.
• Such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage.
• Such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
• Decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected.
• Court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCAÑO

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

Facts:
Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married before a Catholic chaplain and planned to elope.The elopement did not materialize because Vicenta’s mother discovered such marriage. Her parents asked the advice of one Father Reynes and subsequently agreed to recelebrate the marriage. However, Vicenta refused to proceed with the ceremony because a letter from the students of san Carlos College disclosed that Pastor and their matchmaker, Pacita Noel had an amorous relationship. Vicenta left for the States, acquired a foreign divorce and married an American, Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She sought for a divorce from Tenchavez in 1950 and sought ecclesiastical release from her marriage to Tenchavez in 1954. Escano claims that state recognition should be accorded the Church's disavowal of her marriage with Tenchavez.. Escano argued that her second marriage deserves the law’s recognition and protection over the other.es the laws recognition and protection over the other since it fits concept of a marriage as a social institution because publicly contracted, recognized by both civil and ecclesiastical authorities, and blessed by three children. She also contends that the court has no jurisdiction over her.

Husband filed complaint:
Vs. Parents: for having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband and alienating her affections
Vs. Roman Catholic Church: for having decreed annulment

Parents filed counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages.

Issue
WON marriage between Tenchavez and Escano still subsists in lieu of the divorce
WON there is an action for alienation of affections against parents

Held
NO
Ratio:
1. No proof of malice
2. Parents themselves suggested that the marriage be celebrated again
3. Also, Vicenta appeared to have acted independently and being of age, she was entitled to 4. judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected

THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Tenchaves:
With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the matter , and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot be applied in the Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicenta’s refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to damages (2176). When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, 45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive:  filing of suit nay have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured their reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society.