DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. (DANGWA BUS COMPANY), and JAMES G. GAYOTvs. HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, case digest 2 by silao

G.R. No. L-22795 January 31, 1977

DANGWA TRANSPORTATION CO., INC. (DANGWA BUS COMPANY), and JAMES G. GAYOT, petitioners,
vs.
HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, and LAWRENCE HELLER, respondents.

Facts:

On December 30, 1963, at Twin Peaks, Kennon Road, Tuba, Banquet Mountain Province, Dangwa bus was driven by James G. Gayot collided with Lawrence Heller who was then riding on his motorcycle. In the result of the collision, private respondent, Heller, sustained serious physical injuries, namely, a closed fracture of the left femur and a compound fracture of the left tibia, and his motorcycle was totally wrecked. Thereafter, he was confined at the USAF Hospital, Clark Air Base, Angeles, Pampanga. Thus, respondent, file a civil case for damages at Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch I, San Fernando and ruled in his favor.

Private respondent is an American citizen, an Airman First Class of the United States Air Force, and presently assigned and stationed at Clark Air Base Pampanga, Philippines; while the defendant James G. Gayot is a Filipino and a resident of Engineer's Hill, Baguio City and the other defendant Dangwa Bus Company with business address at Trinidad Valley, Banquet Mountain Province.

Issue:

Is residence synonymous to domicile in the law governing venue of actions of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling:

Rule 4 of Rules of Court Sec. 2(b) Personal actions — All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.'

In Koh v. Court of Appeals, It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties litigants by taking into consideration the exit in accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is likewise undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively ore permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

In case of Uytengsu vs. republic,There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary: domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

Respondent court having found that private respondent Lawrence Heller had his actual residence at Clark Air Base, Angeles Pampanga, at the time he filed his personal action against the petitioners, it did not, therefore, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case.