FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 128314 May 29, 2002RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the
spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988
and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of
stock and other personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for
issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1 Pending the appointment
of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special
administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually
dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was
receiving rentals from real properties without rendering any accounting,
and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased parents and
disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.2
He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City
either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The
decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his
late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his
parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence
at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted
documentary evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting of
income tax returns, voter’s affidavits, statements of assets and
liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and
passports, all indicating that their permanent residence was in Angeles
City, Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt
In his opposition,3 Perico countered that
their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon
City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was
conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last
residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4
Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death
certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on
the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the
information regarding the decedents’ residence on the death certificates
in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as
reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late
years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila.
Their stay in his house was merely transitory, in the same way that
they were taken at different times for the same purpose to Perico’s
residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates
could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’
residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.7
Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8
After the parties submitted the names of their respective nominees, the
trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special
administrator of the estate of Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9
On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:
A mere perusal of the death certificates of the
spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively, confirm the
fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the decedents.
Surprisingly, the entries appearing on the death certificate of Andrea
V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose signature appears
in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own
representation by taking an inconsistent position other than his own
admission. xxx xxx xxx.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit movant’s motion to dismiss.
SO ORDERED.10
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On
December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of
discretion of the court a quo having been shown, the petition for
certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent
Judge is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution dated February 17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE
APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL
PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENT’S
RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.
IV
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE
RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING
SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE
CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING VENUE
IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
V
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE
ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH
CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR
PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VI
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF
ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE
CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT
RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.
VII
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI DESPITE THE CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO.
Q-91-8507.13
The main issue before us is: where should the
settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had
their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed
before their demise?
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of
First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first
taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (underscoring ours)
Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the
Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the
proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that the situs
of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his
permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining
residence at the time of death, the following factors must be
considered, namely, the decedent had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom
of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention
to stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that the
decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for
medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon
City as their permanent residence.1âwphi1.nêt
The contention lacks merit.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those
in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away
while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house
in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was
advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was
nearer to his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon
City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In said case, we
ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in
San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his
residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon
City was just temporary.
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that
the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence.
Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that
their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years
before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death
certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the
time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who
filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To our mind, this
unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized
his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner
failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished
a year earlier by respondent.
The recitals in the death certificates, which are
admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed to be
correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate court’s
observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even
before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they
may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their
parents’ death.
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the time of death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:
xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini
"actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile."
This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose
of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than
domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile
in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence
as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile.
No particular length of time of residence is required though; however,
the residence must be more than temporary.17
Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals
found that the decedents have been living with petitioner at the time of
their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion
to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the
challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the
court below considered not only the decedents’ physical presence in
Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the decedents’ stay
therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial
showing that the lower courts’ factual findings stemmed from an
erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held
to be conclusive and binding upon this Court.
Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,18
on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in
the former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the
purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the
decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists
that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent
residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the
properties are kept and where most of the decedents’ properties are
located.
Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a
person’s properties are kept in the place where he permanently resides.
Neither can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be found
mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be that he
has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his
records, or where he maintains extensive personal and business
interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as
the question of where to keep records or retain properties is entirely
dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws
when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and
venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20
we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special
proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence",
in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and
the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the
decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.
Footnote
1 Rollo, p. 87.
2 Ibid., p. 91.
3 Id., p. 95.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 34 & 35.
5 Rollo, p. 101.
6 Record, p. 50.
7 Ibid., p. 51.
8 Id., p. 55.
9 Id., p. 108.
10 Rollo, p. 110; penned by Presiding Judge Felix M. de Guzman.
11 Ibid., p. 71; penned by
Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera; concurred in by Associate Justices
Jaime M. Lantin and Salvador J. Valdez, Jr.
12 Id., p. 73.
13 Id., pp. 23-24.
14 100 Phil., 593 (1956).
15 Ibid., at 596, citing Minor,
Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, p. 169;
Velilla v. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; and Zuellig v. Republic of the
Philippines, 46 O.G. Supp. No. 11, p. 220.
16 74 SCRA 189 (1976).
17 Ibid., at 199-200.
18 SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions.
– All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or
any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
19 166 SCRA 50 (1988).
20 169 SCRA 566 (1989).
21 Ibid., at 571, citing Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, supra, and Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento et al., 75 SCRA 124 (1977).
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