G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007
FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E. BRAGANZA, Respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felicitas
Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan.
Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando
divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in
Calasiao, Pangasinan.
Petitioner contends that
said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with
Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has the personality to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the
ground of bigamy?
RULING:
A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest and must be based on a
cause of action. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Petitioner’s personality to file the petition
to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence
of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have
the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may
restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note
that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired
American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce
decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence
Hence, a remand of the case
to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to
determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether
the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow
respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare
respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio.
G.R.
No. 79284 November 27, 1987
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.
FROILAN C. GANDIONCO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SENEN C. PEÑARANDA, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, Cagayan de Oro City, and TERESITA S. GANDIONCO, respondents.
FACTS:
On 29 May 1986, private
respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner filed civil case against
petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition
for support and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also
filed criminal case against petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986,
application for the provisional remedy of support pendente lite, pending
a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent
in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent judge, as already
stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of support pendente lite.
ISSUES:
1.
Does conviction for concubinage will have to
be first secured before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed?
2. Did the respondent judge
gravely abuse his discretion on the alleged partiality in ordering the payment
of support to his wife pendente lite. ?
RULING:
1.
A decree of legal separation, on the ground of
concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the
action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
In view of the amendment under the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, a civil action for legal separation, based on
concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action
for concubinage, because said civil action is not one "to enforce
the civil liability arising from the offense" even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense.
2.
Divergence
of opinions between a judge hearing a case and a party's counsel, as to
applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground to disqualify the
judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. No
proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in
ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of
in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the
judge. If petitioner finds the amount of
support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a
motion to modify or reduce the same.
G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006
ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG, Respondents.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG, Respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondent Tristan
A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The marriage
produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital
problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney
addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under
its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner
Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States and both lived as
husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned
that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which
"dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized
in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under
Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Perez has a legal
interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be intervenor in
Tristan’s petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife?
RULING:
No,
Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14,
1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that
Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the
marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of
where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by
Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his
or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of
whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to
obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in
getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such
absolute divorce. Petitioner’s
claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated
abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a
wife upon which her motion for intervention is based.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
FACTS:
October 1986, respondent Lolita
Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship in Japan.
They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back
to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio
were married in Bacoor, Cavite. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned
to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime
in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the
Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not mere abandonment by the
husband of his family and his insensitivity to them automatically constitute
psychological incapacity?
2.
Whether or not requirements of
psychological incapacity apply to mixed marriages?
RULING:
1.
No. the policy of the 1987 Constitution
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The burden of proof to show
the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. Toshio’s
act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. We cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. In Molina,
it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and
duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable
of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
2.
The husband being a Japanese national is
immaterial in proving psychological incapacity, no distinction between an alien
spouse and a Filipino spouse. Hence, the norms used for determining
psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality.
G.R.
No. L-41427 June 10, 1988
CONSTANCIA
C. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO DAVID, respondents.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CONSUELO DAVID, respondents.
GUTIERREZ,
JR., J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner Constancia C. Tolentino is the
present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino, their marriage having been celebrated
on April 21, 1945 in Manila. The union produced three children.
Respondent Consuelo David was legally married
to Arturo Tolentino on February 8, 1931. Their marriage likewise produced
children. The marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during
the Japanese occupation on September 15, 1943 by a decree of absolute divorce
on the ground of desertion and abandonment by the wife. The trial court granted
the divorce on its finding that Arturo Tolentino was abandoned by Consuelo
David for at least three (3) continuous years.
Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a
certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon after their marriage. Tolentino
subsequently married Constancia on April 21, 1945.
Consuelo David, on the other hand, continued
using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time of the filing
of this complaint.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the petitioner's cause of action has already prescribed, and
2.
Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from
using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced.
RULING:
1. The
petitioner should have brought legal action immediately against the private
respondent after she gained knowledge of the use by the private respondent of
the surname of her former husband. As it is, action was brought only on
November 23, 1971 with only verbal demands in between and an action to
reconstitute the divorce case. The petitioner should have filed her complaint
at once when it became evident that the private respondent would not accede to
her demands instead of waiting for twenty (20) years
As
aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, "where the plaintiff fails to go to
the Court within the prescriptive period, he loses his cause, but not because
the defendant had acquired ownership by adverse possession over his name but
because the plaintiffs cause of action had lapsed thru the statute of
limitations."
2. Philippine
law is understandably silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws and
consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for. It is
significant to note that Senator Tolentino himself in his commentary on Art.
370 of the Civil Code states that "the wife cannot claim an exclusive
right to use the husband's surname. She cannot be prevented from using it; but
neither can she restrain others from using it."
The
petitioner, on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any
legal injury or deprivation of legal rights inasmuch as she can use her
husband's surname and be fully protected in case the respondent uses the
surname Tolentino for illegal purposes.
In Silva,
et al. v. Peralta (110 Phil. 57) cited by the petitioner, it was not the
mere use of the surname that was enjoined but the defendant's representation
that she was the wife of Saturnino Silva. There was, therefore, a usurpation of
the wife's status which is absent in the case at bar.