EN BANC
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
LEONEN, J.:
This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with
shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the facts and the law, to
approximate justice for her.
We are asked to decide a petition for review
1 on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision
2 dated June 27, 2005. This decision partially affirmed the National Labor RelationsCommission’s resolution dated March 31, 2004,
3
declaring respondent’s dismissal illegal, directing petitioner to pay
respondent’s three-month salary equivalent to New Taiwan Dollar (NT$)
46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse the NT$3,000.00 withheld from
respondent, and pay her NT$300.00 attorney’s fees.
4
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
5 Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan.
6
Joy’s application was accepted.
7 Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.
8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of
P70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.
9
Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.
10 She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.
11 In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
12
Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyclaims that on July
14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informedJoy, without prior
notice, that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report
to their office to get her salary and passport."
13 She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."
14
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.
15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
16
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint
17 with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.
18
She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for
repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral
and exemplary damages.
19 She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal.
20
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that
respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her
duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her
foreign [employer]."
21 The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of
P70,000.00.
22 As evidence, it showedOfficial Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing the amount of
P20,360.00.
23
Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had
already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management
Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.
24 Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.
25
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it.
26 It alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship between them.
27 Therefore, the claims against it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
28
Pacific Manpower argued that the employment contract should first be
presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations might be
identified.
29 It further denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts.
30
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint.
31 Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mereallegations.
32
The Labor Arbiter found that there was no excess payment of placement
fees, based on the official receipt presented by petitioner.
33 The Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a discussion on petitioner’s transfer of obligations to Pacific
34 and considered the matter immaterial in view of the dismissal of respondent’s complaint.
35
Joy appealed
36 to the National Labor Relations Commission.
In a resolution
37 dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission declared that Joy was illegally dismissed.
38
It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the
dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer.
39 It found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination.
40
There was no sufficient proofto show that respondent was inefficient in
her work and that she failed to comply with company requirements.
41 Furthermore, procedural dueprocess was not observed in terminating respondent.
42
The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees for lack of jurisdiction.
43 It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific.
44
It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision not to
rule on the matter.
45
The National Labor Relations Commission awarded
respondent only three (3) months worth of salaryin the amount of
NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and
attorney’s fees of NT$300.
46
The Commission denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration
47 dated May 12, 2004 through a resolution
48 dated July 2, 2004.
Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition
49
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor
Relations Commission’s resolutions dated March 31, 2004 and July 2,
2004.
The Court of Appeals
50
affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with
respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the
equivalent of three months worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld
repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees.
51
The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor Relations
Commission to address the validity of petitioner's allegations against
Pacific.
52
The Court of Appeals held, thus: Although the public respondent found
the dismissal of the complainant-respondent illegal, we should point out
that the NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months backwages or the
amount of NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its finding that she was
dismissed without due process, a finding that we uphold, given
petitioner’s lack of worthwhile discussion upon the same in the
proceedings below or before us. Likewise we sustain NLRC’s finding in
regard to the reimbursement of her fare, which is squarely based on the
law; as well as the award of attorney’s fees.
But we do find it necessary to remand the instant
case to the public respondent for further proceedings, for the purpose
of addressing the validity or propriety of petitioner’s third-party
complaint against the transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower &
Management Services, Inc. and Lea G. Manabat. We should emphasize that
as far as the decision of the NLRC on the claims of Joy Cabiles, is
concerned, the same is hereby affirmed with finality, and we hold
petitioner liable thereon, but without prejudice to further hearings on
its third party complaint against Pacific for reimbursement.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
Resolutions are hereby partly AFFIRMED in accordance with the foregoing
discussion, but subject to the caveat embodied inthe last sentence. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
53
Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.
54
We are asked to determine whether the Court of
Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding
her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost ofher
repatriation, and attorney’s fees despite the alleged existence of just
causes of termination.
Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for
termination because there was a finding of Wacoal that respondent was
inefficient in her work.
55
Therefore, it claims that respondent’s dismissal was valid.
56
Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal’s
accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at the time respondent
filed her complaint, it should be Pacific that should now assume
responsibility for Wacoal’s contractual obligations to the workers
originally recruited by petitioner.
57
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’spetition is without merit. We find for respondent.
I
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that
there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal,
also failed to accord her due process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work.
58 They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards.
59 Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.
60
Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of
anemployee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of
the employer.
61
While the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it
does not "authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer."
62 Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employee’s right to security of tenure."
63
Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
termination. They may not be removed from employment without a validor
just cause as determined by law and without going through the proper
procedure.
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.
64
Employees are not stripped of their security of
tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With respect
to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of
lex loci contractus.Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v.
NLRC,
65 this court noted:
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical
certificate requirement by contending that since Osdana was working in
Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host
country. Apparently, petitioner hopes tomake it appear that the labor
laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent
public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.
First, established is the rule that lex loci
contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in
this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment
in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor
Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting
labor apply in this case.Furthermore, settled is the rule that the
courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy. Herein the Philippines, employment agreements are
more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article
XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:
The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
selforganization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of
work, and a living wage. Theyshall also participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
. . . .
This public policy should be borne in mind in this
case because to allow foreign employers to determine for and by
themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the
ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pretermination of
employment contracts.
66 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC,
67 to wit:
Petitioners admit that they did notinform private
respondent in writing of the charges against him and that they failed to
conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side.
However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements ofnotice and
hearing applies strictly only when the employment is within the
Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in cases of
international maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the
Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford protection to labor
apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or
abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the
place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the
present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment entered
into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed
here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with
its implementing rules and regulations and other laws affecting labor
apply in this case.
68 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may
only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and after compliance
with procedural due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family
or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondentwas inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties
69 may, therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for
termination is on the employer. "The employer must affirmatively show
rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable
cause."
70 Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.
71
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in
work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set standards
of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged;
2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated
tothe employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time
prior to the employee’s performance assessment.
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on
probationary employees, which allow termination ofthe employee only when
there is "just cause or when [the probationary employee] fails to
qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his [or her]
engagement."
72
However, we do not see why the application of that
ruling should be limited to probationary employment. That rule is basic
to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which are guaranteed
to all employees, whether their employment is probationary or regular.
The pre-determined standards that the employer sets
are the bases for determining the probationary employee’s fitness,
propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee. Due
process requires that the probationary employee be informed of such
standards at the time of his or her engagement so he or she can
adjusthis or her character or workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment
to fit the standards upon which the employee’s qualifications will be
evaluated will increase one’s chances of being positively assessed for
regularization by his or her employer.
Assessing an employee’s work performance does not
stop after regularization. The employer, on a regular basis, determines
if an employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work
standards. Based on that determination, and after complying with the due
process requirements of notice and hearing, the employer may exercise
its management prerogative of terminating the employee found
unqualified.
The regular employee must constantlyattempt to prove
to his or her employer that he or she meets all the standards for
employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set for the
purpose of retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be
expected to meet any standard of character or workmanship if such
standards were not communicated to him or her. Courts should remain
vigilant on allegations of the employer’s failure to communicatework
standards that would govern one’s employment "if [these are] to
discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate."
73
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that
respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work
requirements and was inefficient in her work.
74
No evidence was shown to support such allegations. Petitioner did not
even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what efficiency
standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent
constituted inefficiency.
There was also no showing that respondent was
sufficiently informed of the standards against which her work efficiency
and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the position
held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title
was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient
to support a claim that there is just cause for termination. There is
no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Petitioner failed to comply with
the due process requirements
Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring
and her repatriation on the same day show not onlyfailure on the partof
petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence of just
cause for termination. They patently show that the employersdid not
comply with the due process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.
75 The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination.
76 One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal.
77 The other notice must "[inform] the employee of the employer’s decision."
78 Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity to be heard."
79
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and
hearing requirements. Respondent started working on June 26, 1997. She
was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on the same
day and barely a month from her first workday. She was also repatriated
on the same day that she was informed of her termination. The abruptness
of the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified
and given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due
process of law was violated.
II
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally
dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion ofthe
employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and
reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise known
as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of1995, states
thatoverseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or
authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries
for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. – Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after
filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section
shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated
in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the
recruitment/placementagency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for
all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate
officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves
be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation orpartnership for
the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire
period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected
by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a
foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary
agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this section shall
be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the settlement by
the appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee
with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that
"repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or her] personal
belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which
recruited or deployed the worker overseas." The exception is when
"termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker,"
80
which as we have established, is not the case. It reads: SEC. 15.
REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. – The repatriation
of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the
primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the
worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by
or charged to the agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the
repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of a
deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the
principal and/or local agency. However, in cases where the termination
of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker, the
principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for
the repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.
. . . .
The Labor Code
81 also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorney’s feeswhen the withholding is unlawful.
The Court of Appeals affirmedthe National Labor
Relations Commission’s decision to award respondent NT$46,080.00 or the
threemonth equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and
the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for
her repatriation.
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to
all of these awards. The award of the three-month equivalent of
respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the amount
equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,
82 this court ruled that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"
83 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
84
A statute or provision which was declared
unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all."
85
We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"was reinstated
in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in
2010. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides:
Section 7.Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.– Notwithstanding any provision
of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after
the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract
involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for
actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damage. Consistent with this
mandate, the NLRC shall endeavor to update and keep abreast with the
developments in the global services industry.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section
shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for
its approval. The performance bond to de [sic] filed by the
recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable
for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If
the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate
officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves
be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership
for the aforesaid claims and damages.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire
period or duration of the employment contract and shall not be affected
by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a
foreign country of the said contract.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary
agreement on money claims inclusive of damages under this section shall
be paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the settlement by the
appropriate authority.
In case of termination of overseas employment without
just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any
unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s salary, the worker
shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee
and the deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum,
plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is less.
In case of a final and executory judgement against a
foreign employer/principal, it shall be automatically disqualified,
without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine
Overseas Employment Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino
workers until and unless it fully satisfies the judgement award.
Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for
resolutions of case providedunder this section shall subject the
responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
(a) The salary of any such official who fails to
render his decision or resolution within the prescribed period shall be,
or caused to be, withheld until the said official complies therewith;
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
(c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public office for five (5) years.
Provided, however,That the penalties herein provided
shall be without prejudice to any liability which any such official may
have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules and regulations as
a consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis
supplied)
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8,
2010. This means that the reinstatement of the clause in Republic Act
No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s termination
from work in 1997.
86 Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended byRepublic Act No. 10022 governs this case.
When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual
case that clearly raises adversarial positions in their proper context
before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional.
However, we are confronted with a unique situation.
The law passed incorporates the exact clause already declared as
unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the
circumstances.
This may cause confusion on the part of the National
Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals.At minimum, the
existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the
judgment in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong
done to petitioner.
Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.
Moreover, this court is possessed with the
constitutional duty to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights."
87
When cases become mootand academic, we do not hesitate to provide for
guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations are
capable of repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to cases
where there are millions of Filipinos working abroad who are bound to
suffer from the lack of protection because of the restoration of an
identical clause in a provision previously declared as unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is
supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers
in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the
existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution
cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of
the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null
because it is inconsistent with the Constitution,the nullity cannot be
cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared
unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have sochanged as
to warrant a reverse conclusion.
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by
the parties that the situation has so changed so as to cause us to
reverse binding precedent.
Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial
efficiency and economy that attend to these cases. The new law puts our
overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were prior to
Serrano. Failure to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will
result in the same untold economic hardships that our reading of the
Constitution intended to avoid. Obviously, we cannot countenance added
expenses for further litigation thatwill reduce their hardearned wages
as well as add to the indignity of having been deprived of the
protection of our laws simply because our precedents have not been
followed. There is no constitutional doctrine that causes injustice in
the face of empty procedural niceties. Constitutional interpretation is
complex, but it is never unreasonable.
Thus, in a resolution
88
dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties and the Office of the
Solicitor General to comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated
clause in Republic Act No. 10022.
In its comment,
89 petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional.
90
The legislators intended a balance between the employers’ and the
employees’ rights by not unduly burdening the local recruitment agency.
91 Petitioner is also of the view that the clause was already declared as constitutional in Serrano.
92
The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and constitutional.
93
However, since the parties never raised the issue of the
constitutionality of the clause asreinstated in Republic Act No. 10022,
its contention is that it is beyond judicial review.
94
On the other hand, respondentargued that the clause was unconstitutional because it infringed on workers’ right to contract.
95
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as
provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights
to equal protection and due process.
96
Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any
compelling changein the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit
the precedent.
We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant
Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by anillegally
dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due
process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that
persons under like circumstances and falling within the same class are
treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced."
97
It is a guarantee against "undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of
inequality."
98
In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to make distinctions and classifications."
99
In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion.
100
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.
101 A law is void on this basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily.
102
There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies
equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable
grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and
those who do not fall within the class.
103 A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribesa reasonable classification.
104
A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the
law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must
apply equally to all members of the same class."
105
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by
the reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-period overseas
workers and fixedperiod local workers.
106
It also distinguished between overseas workers with employment
contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with employment
contracts of at least one year.
107
Within the class of overseas workers with at least one-year employment
contracts, there was a distinction between those with at least a year
left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their
contracts when they were illegally dismissed.
108
The Congress’ classification may be subjected to
judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative classification
which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right
or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."
109
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection.
110
Thus, this court in Serrano, "[i]mbued with the same sense of
‘obligation to afford protection to labor,’ . . . employ[ed] the
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject
clause a suspect classification prejudicial to OFWs."
111
We also noted in Serranothat before the passage of
Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally terminated overseas
and local workers with fixed-term employment werecomputed in the same
manner.
112 Their money claims were computed based onthe "unexpired portions of their contracts."
113
The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042
subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with
an unexpired term of at least a year to a cap of three months worth of
their salary.
114 There was no such limitation on the money claims of illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term employment.
115
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers
whose employment contracts had a term of less than one year were
granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their
employment contracts.
116
Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with employment terms
of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of
their salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts.
117
Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we
also found that "the subject clause creates a sub-layer of
discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one
year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in
their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with
one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the
reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries
for three months only."
118
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these
classifications do not rest on any real or substantial distinctions
that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of
money claims resulting from illegal termination.
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications
are entitled to security of tenure, at least for the period agreed upon
in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the
end of their contract terms without due process. If they were illegally
dismissed, the workers’ right to security of tenure is violated.
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local
worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than norless than the
rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally
terminated. It is state policy to protect the rights of workers
withoutqualification as to the place of employment.
119
In both cases, the workers are deprived of their expected salary, which
they could have earned had they not been illegally dismissed. For both
workers, this deprivation translates to economic insecurity and
disparity.
120
The same is true for the distinctions between overseas workers with an
employment contract of less than one year and overseas workers with at
least one year of employment contract, and between overseas workers with
at least a year left in their contracts and overseas workers with less
than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed.
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument
that "[overseas workers] are contractual employeeswho can never acquire
regular employment status, unlike local workers"
121 because it already justifies differentiated treatment in terms ofthe computation of money claims.
122
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues
on overseas workers’ money claims do not justify a differentiated
treatment in the computation of their money claims.
123
If anything, these issues justify an equal, if not greater protection
and assistance to overseas workers who generally are more prone to
exploitation given their physical distance from our government.
We also find that the classificationsare not relevant
to the purpose of the law, which is to "establish a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their
families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes."
124
Further, we find specious the argument that reducing the liability of
placement agencies "redounds to the benefit of the [overseas] workers."
125
Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas
workers does not increase the standard of protection afforded to them.
On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivizedby the
reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at least a year because it
gives them more flexibility to violate our overseas workers’ rights.
Their liability for arbitrarily terminating overseas workers is
decreased at the expense of the workers whose rights they violated.
Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are impressed with an expectation
of a stable job overseas for the longer contract period disregard other
opportunities only to be terminated earlier. They are left with claims
that are less than what others in the same situation would receive. The
reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation where the law meant to
protect them makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to the
violator.
As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:
Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid
rules and measures, and in fact provides a hidden twist affecting the
principal/employer’s liability. While intended as an incentive accruing
to recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the
OFWs’ recovery in wrongfuldismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the
benefit of whoever may be liable, including the principal/employer –
the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful dismissal. In this
sense, Section 10 – read as a grant of incentives to
recruitment/manning agencies – oversteps what it aims to do by
effectively limiting what is otherwise the full liability of the foreign
principals/employers. Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit
the wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to
mitigate its liability for wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden
twist, the limitation ofliability under Section 10 cannot be an
"appropriate" incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself
uses to describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.
What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of
granting the incentive: instead of a grant that, to encourage greater
efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts undertaken,
the law simply limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of
already deployed OFWs. This is effectively a legally-imposed partial
condonation of their liability to OFWs, justified solely by the law’s
intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the incentive,from
a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to sell
Filipino overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting
the market. . . .
The so-called incentive is rendered particularly
odious by its effect on the OFWs — the benefits accruing to the
recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are takenfrom the
pockets of the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion
of the contract rightfully belong. Thus, the principals/employers and
the recruitment/manning agencies even profit from their violation of the
security of tenure that an employment contract embodies. Conversely,
lesser protection is afforded the OFW, not only because of the lessened
recovery afforded him or her by operation of law, but also because this
same lessened recovery renders a wrongful dismissal easier and less
onerous to undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a Filipino will
always bea consideration a foreign employer will take into account in
termination of employment decisions. . . .
126
Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for
any form of government action that alleviates the burden of one sector,
but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the
favored sector is composed of private businesses suchas placement
agencies, while the disadvantaged sector is composed ofOFWs whose
protection no less than the Constitution commands. The idea thatprivate
business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state
interest is odious."
127
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated
clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives
overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid
purpose.
128
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for
the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of
respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started
working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent
is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule
otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and
would,in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure
which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such
violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law."
129
III
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which revised the interest rate for
loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation,applies
in this case. The pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of
2013, read: The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May
2013, approved the following revisions governing the rate of interest in
the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby amending Section 2
of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982:
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rateof
interest, shall be six percent (6%) per annum.
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of
the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and
4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions
are hereby amended accordingly.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado
Peralta, we laid down the guidelines in computing legal interest in
Nacar v. Gallery Frames:
130
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest
in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest,
as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists
in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money,
the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest
from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default,
i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the
provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages
awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6%
per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated
claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be established
with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil
Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at
the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from
the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the
quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest
shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the
judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be
by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have
become final and executory prior to July 1, 2013, shall not be disturbed
and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest
fixed therein.
131
Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and
forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in judgments when there is
no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it is only
applicable if the judgment did not become final and executory before
July 1, 2013.
132
We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when
there is a law that states otherwise. While the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates,
133
these interest rates do not apply when the law provides that a
different interest rate shall be applied. "[A] Central Bank Circular
cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law."
134
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers are entitled to the
reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12% per
annum. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannotrepeal Republic
Act No. 8042, the issuance of Circular No. 799 does not have the effect
of changing the interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees
from 12% to 6%. This is despite Section 1 of Circular No. 799, which
provides that the 6% interest rate applies even to judgments.
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts.
"The contracting parties need not repeat them. They do not even have to
be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only what has been
explicitly stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any
bearing on the matter."
135
There is, therefore, an implied stipulation in contracts between the
placement agency and the overseasworker that in case the overseas worker
is adjudged as entitled to reimbursement of his or her placement fees,
the amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per annum. This implied
stipulation has the effect of removing awards for reimbursement of
placement fees from Circular No. 799’s coverage.
The same cannot be said for awardsof salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract under Republic Act No.
8042. These awards are covered by Circular No. 799 because the law does
not provide for a specific interest rate that should apply.
In sum, if judgment did not become final and
executory before July 1, 2013 and there was no stipulation in the
contract providing for a different interest rate, other money claims
under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6%
interest per annum in accordance with Circular No. 799.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an
interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from the finality of this
judgment.
IV
Finally, we clarify the liabilities ofWacoal as
principal and petitioner as the employment agency that facilitated
respondent’s overseas employment.
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer and the local
employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims
including claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or
damages. This section also provides that the performance bond filed by
the local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if
they were awarded to the employee.
This provision is in line with the state’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating workers’ plight.
136
In overseas employment, the filing of money claims
against the foreign employer is attended by practical and legal
complications.1âwphi1 The distance of the foreign employer
alonemakes it difficult for an overseas worker to reach it and make it
liable for violations of the Labor Code. There are also possible
conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural rules that may
be raised to frustrate an overseas worker’sattempt to advance his or her
claims.
It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign
employer must be impleaded in the complaint as an indispensable party
without which no final determination can be had of an action.
137
The provision on joint and several liability in the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 assures overseas
workers that their rights will not be frustrated with these
complications. The fundamental effect of joint and several liability is
that "each of the debtors is liable for the entire obligation."
138
A final determination may, therefore, be achieved even if only oneof
the joint and several debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the
case of overseas employment, either the local agency or the foreign
employer may be sued for all claims arising from the foreign employer’s
labor law violations. This way, the overseas workers are assured that
someone — the foreign employer’s local agent — may be made to answer for
violationsthat the foreign employer may have committed.
The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in law despite the
circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability of
the foreign employer may be "enforced to the full extent"
139 against the local agent,the overseas worker is assured of immediate and sufficientpayment of what is due them.
140
Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in
law, the provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going after the
foreign employer from the overseas worker to the local employment
agency. However, it must be emphasized that the local agency that is
held to answer for the overseas worker’s money claims is not leftwithout
remedy. The law does not preclude it from going after the foreign
employer for reimbursement of whatever payment it has made to the
employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign employer.
A further implication of making localagencies jointly
and severally liable with the foreign employer is thatan additional
layer of protection is afforded to overseas workers. Local agencies,
which are businesses by nature, are inoculated with interest in being
always on the lookout against foreign employers that tend to violate
labor law. Lest they risk their reputation or finances, local
agenciesmust already have mechanisms for guarding against unscrupulous
foreign employers even at the level prior to overseas employment
applications.
With the present state of the pleadings, it is not
possible to determine whether there was indeed a transfer of obligations
from petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an obstacle for the
respondent overseas worker to proceed with the enforcement of this
judgment. Petitioner is possessed with the resources to determine the
proper legal remedies to enforce its rights against Pacific, if any.
V
Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos
may encounter as they travel into the farthest and mostdifficult reaches
of our planet to provide for their families. In Prieto v. NLRC:
141
The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered
by our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured,
usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future.
Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment,
sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a
few of the inhumane acts towhich they are subjected by their foreign
employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their own
country. Whilethese workers may indeed have relatively little defense
against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not
continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice
their muted complaint. There is no reason why, in their very own land,
the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full
measure for the redress of their grievances.
142
But it seems that we have not said enough.
We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and
their heroism can be told a million times over; each of their stories as
real as any other. Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures and
the heartbreak of families left behind daily. They would count the
minutes, hours, days, months, and years yearning to see their sons and
daughters. We all know of the joy and sadness when they come home to see
them all grown up and, being so, they remember what their work has cost
them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and many other gadgets and online
applications will never substitute for their lost physical presence.
Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat through
the ebb and flow of political and economic crises. They are our true
diplomats, they who show the world the resilience, patience, and
creativity of our people. Indeed, we are a people who contribute much to
the provision of material creations of this world.
This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure
decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default by limiting the
contractual wages that should be paid to our workers when their
contracts are breached by the foreign employers. While we sit, this
court will ensure that our laws will reward our overseas workers with
what they deserve: their dignity.
Inevitably, their dignity is ours as weil.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles
the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the
withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorney's fees of
NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
judgment.
The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONENAssociate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On Leave)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice |
See: Concur/Dissenting Opn.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice |
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice |
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice |
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice |
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice |
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice |
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice |
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice |
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIOActing Chief Justice
Footnotes
* On Leave.
1 Rollo, pp. 3–29.
2 Id. at 32–44.
3 Id. at 125–131.
4 Id. at 131.
5 Id. at 3.
6 Id. at 126.
7 Id. at 102.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 54 and 102.
11 Id. at 6–7 and 195–196.
12 Id. at 36.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 127.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 53.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 33, 53, and 54.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 11.
22 Id. at 56.
23 Id. at 56 and 62.
24 Id. at 57.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 107.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 108.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 101–112.
32 Id. at 108–110.
33 Id. at 110.
34 Id. at 111–112.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 113–123.
37 Id. at 125–131.
38 Id. at 131.
39 Id. at 129.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id at 130.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 131.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 132–137.
48 Id. at 139–141.
49 Id. at 142–153.
50
Thirteenth Division, decision penned by Associate Justice Renato
C.Dacudao with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and Japar B.
Dimaampao concurring.
51 Rollo, pp. 43–44.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 3–29.
55 Id. at 11.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 9–11.
58 Leonardo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 389 Phil. 118, 126–127 (2000) [Per J. De Leon, Jr., Second Division].
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 San Miguel Corporation v. Ubaldo, G.R. No. 92859, February 1, 1993, 218 SCRA 293, 301 [Per J. Campos, Jr., Second Division].
62 Id.
63 Bascon v. Court of Appeals, 466 Phil. 719, 732 (2004) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
64 CONST., art. XIII, sec. 3.
65 359 Phil. 955 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
66 Id. at 968–969.
67 540 Phil. 65 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
68 Id. at 80–81.
69 Rollo, p. 11.
70
Hilton Heavy Equipment Corporation v. Dy, G.R. No. 164860, February 2,
2010, 611 SCRA 329, 338 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], citing Dizon
v. NLRC, 259 Phil. 523, 529 (1989) [Per J. Feliciano, Third Division].
71
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
527 Phil. 248, 257 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First Division].
72
LABOR CODE, art. 281; See also Tamson’s Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 192881, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 374, 383 [Per J.
Mendoza, Third Division].
73
Seedissenting opinion of J. Brion in Abbott Laboratories Philippines v.
Alcaraz, G.R. No. 192571, July 23, 2013, 701 SCRA 682, 752 [Per J.
Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc]. This ponencia joined J. Brion.
74 Rollo, p. 129.
75
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Doza, et al., G.R. No. 175558,
February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 412, 426 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Rep. Act. No. 8042 (1995), sec. 15.
81
Article 111. Attorney’s Fees – (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of
wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to
ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
82 601 Phil. 245 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
83 Rep. Act. No. 8042 (1995), sec. 10, par. 5.
84 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 302 and 304 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
85 Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369, 380 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
86
See also Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Doza, et al., G.R. No.
175558, February 8, 2012, 665 SCRA 430 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
87 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(5).
88 Rollo, pp. 266–267.
89 Id. at 309–328.
90 Id. at 311.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 364–371.
94 Id. at 371.
95 Id. at 304.
96
CONST., art. III, sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.
97 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1164 (1957) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].
98 Id. at 1164.
99 Id. at 1177.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1164 and 1177.
102 Id. at 1165 and 1177.
103 Id. at 1164.
104 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939) [Per J. Moran, En Banc].
105 Id. at 18.
106 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 294–298 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
107 Id. at 287–292.
108 Id. at 292–294.
109 Id. at 282.
110 CONST., art. XIII, sec. 3.
111 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 286 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
112 Id. at 297–298.
113 Id. at 298.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 287–292.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 293.
119 Id. at 281.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 277.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 276–277.
124 Rep. Act. No. 8042 (1995); See alsoRep. Act No. 10022 (2010).
125 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 277 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, En Banc].
126
Seeconcurring opinion of J. Brion in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime
Services, Inc., 601 Phil. 245, 319–321 (2009) [Per J. Austria-Martinez,
En Banc].
127 Id. at 301.
128 Id. at 304.
129 Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management, G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 369, 381 [Per J. Nachura, Second Division].
130 G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
131
Id. at 457–458. This court modified the guidelines laid down in Eastern
Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234
SCRA 78, 97[Per J. Vitug, En Banc] to embody Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Circular No. 799.
132 Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, August 13, 2013, 703 SCRA 439, 457 [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].
133 Id.
134 Palanca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106685, December 2, 1994,238 SCRA 593, 601 [Per J. Quiason, En Banc].
135 Maritime Company of the Philippines v. Reparations Commission, 148-B Phil. 65, 70 (1971) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
136
ATCI Overseas Corporation v. Echin,G.R. No. 178551, October 11, 2010,
632 SCRA 528, 533 [Per J. Carpio-Morales, Third Division], citing
Datuman v. First Cosmopolitan Manpower and Promotion Services, Inc., 591
Phil. 662, 673 (2008) [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division];
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, sec. 2(b).
137 RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, sec. 7.
138 PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 821, 832 (2001) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
139 See alsoC. A. AZUCENA, JR., EVERYONE’S LABOR CODE29 (5th ed., 2007).
140 Id.
141 G..R. No. 93699, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 232 [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
142
Id. at 239–240, also cited in Triple Eight Integrated Services v. NLRC,
359 Phil. 955, 968 (1998) [Per J. Romero, Third Division].
